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COMMENTS

THE "CUCKOO'S NEST" REASSESSED:
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
AFTER SUZUKI v. YUEN AND DOE v. GALLINOT*
It makes little sense to guard zealously against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the patient disappears behind hospital doors.

Chief Judge Bazelon in Covington v. Harris'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Civil commitments occupy a unique position in our present civil system. Under the commitment statutes of most
states, the government can commit when there has been no
violative act. A person can be incarcerated on the basis of a
prediction of danger to self or others, or (in California) on the
basis of grave disability. A further anomaly is that "the treatment decision is made by people trained in the law," while
"the question of criminality is left to physicians."'
The problems inherent in predictions of dangerousness
have been well documented. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of error in diagnosis and follow-up is the experiment
of Dr. N.L. Rosenhan where eight sane persons feigning illness
were diagnosed as being mentally ill. The patients gave true
life histories to the examiner. None had serious pathological
backgrounds. They entered mental institutions where immediately upon admission they ceased their simulations of abnoro 1982 by Gretchen 0. Burford
* The author would like to express her appreciation to Paul Fogel of the
California State Public Defenders Office who took time from a very busy schedule to
review and discuss this comment.
1. 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
2. Alexander, PrematureProbate:A Different Perspectiveon Guardianshipfor
the Elderly, 31 STA.

L. Rzv. 1003, 1029 (1979).
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mal behavior. However, their subsequent behavior was either
overlooked or profoundly misinterpreted. All were released after an average stay of nineteen days with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in remission.3 Ironically, it was fairly common for
the actual mental patients to detect the sanity of the pseudopatients. Rosenhan's conclusion was that psychiatrists tend to
err on the side of caution, because "it is clearly more dangerous to misdiagnose illness than health."4
Because of the unique position of civil commitments in
the legal system and the problems inherent in a "predictive"
system of justice, the courts have increased their scrutiny of
this process. The result has been more due process protections
for the mentally ill.5 This comment will focus on the failure of
California's mental health law to provide due process protections for the mentally ill during the initial seventy-two hour
evaluation and treatment period and the subsequent period
where the patient, having been evaluated, is certified for fourteen days of involuntary intensive treatment. Due process inequities include a failure to provide counsel and probable
cause hearings during this time. This comment analyzes the
California statutory criteria for involuntary commitments.
The current standard is not sufficiently precise, as it allows
commitment on the basis of grave disability alone. This lack
of precision encourages additional due process violations of
patients' rights in the initial stages of commitment. In two recent decisions, Suzuki v. Yuen 7 and Doe v.Gallinot,8 the federal courts have examined both the statutory criteria for commitment and the due process protections during evaluation
and certification. This comment examines the impact of these
two decisions on California law, concluding with suggested
changes in evaluation and certification provisions under the
3. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379, 38284 (1973).
4. Id. at 385.
5. For a description of the prior chequered history of court commitments see
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084-94 (E.D. Wis. 1972) vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (per curiam) (to create a more specific and detailed order), 379
F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975) (mem.)
(for further consideration in light of a recent decision), 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976). See also Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (D. Hawaii 1977).
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5150, 5250 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
7. 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
8. 486 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afl'd 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS).9
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Federal Decisions

Judicial analysis of mental health law reveals two common themes: concern about the high risk of error inherent in
the initial commitment recommendation and concern for the
loss of liberty and stigma attached to civil commitments. In
Humphrey v.Cady, the Supreme Court took note of the indisputable fact that civil commitment entails "a massive curtailment of liberty" in the constitutional sense. ' In O'Connor
v. Donaldson, the Court rejected deprivation of an individual's liberty on the basis of mental illness alone if the person
is "dangerous to no one and can live safely in society."" The
Court in O'Connor, avoided defining the exact basis for commitment but provided some guidelines: 1) Incarceration cannot be used to raise "the living standards of those capable of
surviving safely in freedom" and 2) "[m]ere public intolerance
or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of
'1 2
a person's physical liberty.
Recently, the Court, in Addington v. Texas,1 3 held that
the need for civil commitment must be provided by clear and
convincing evidence. The Court stated that "due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence."" Although
the Court's decision was based on the individual's right to liberty,'5 it also expressed concern about the risk of error involved in the commitment process.16 The loss of liberty and
the stigma attached to mental commitments served as the rationale for the Supreme Court in Vitek v. Jones,17 when it
held that notice and a hearing are required prior to the trans9. CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-464 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1982); 1968 Cal.
Stat. ch. 1374.

10. 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
11. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See also Schlette v. Burdick, 633 F.2d 920, 922 (9th
Cir. 1980) (O'Connorstandard applied to involuntary commitment of a severely dis-

abled individual).
12. 422 U.S. at 575.
13. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
14. Id. at 425.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 427.
17. 445 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1979).
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fer of a convicted felon from a prison to a mental hospital.
The Vitek Court additionally required that the state provide
a qualified and independent advisor to assist the patient."'
The district court decision providing the most procedural protections for the mentally ill is Lessard v. Schmidt.19 The decision reflects the current tendency of many district courts to
adopt the O'Connor-Addington line of reasoning, thereby
modifying the parens patriae concept of the state as provider
and protector of the mentally ill. The result is a legalistic
standard that requires more specificity and greater procedural
protections in commitment statutes. The Lessard court mandated a finding of imminent dangerousness as evidenced by a
recent overt act before confinement for evaluation. Post-commitment requirements imposed by the court include the
equivalent of a Miranda warning to the patient, probable
cause hearings and treatment within forty-eight hours,
mandatory court hearings within seventeen days with the assistance of counsel and, finally, a state investigation of the
least restrictive alternative to commitment.2 0
B.

LPS: California'sResponse to the Need for Reform

The increased concern over the rights of the mentally ill
has led to inevitable tension between the mental health providers and the legal system.2 1 For example, psychiatrists, resentful of the legalistic approach, perceive the time constraints created by the courts as a threatening incursion on
their need to diagnose and treat with relative freedom. The
California Legislature, in rewriting its mental commitment
statute, attempted to reconcile these differences. In the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS),2 2 the legislature opted to reduce long-term confinement of the mentally ill. To please the
medical community, the legislature allowed the local treatment system to hold a person a maximum of seventeen days
18. Id. at 499-500.
19. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-1102 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See supra note 5 for subsequent case history.
20. 379 F. Supp. at 1380-82. See supra note 5 for prior and subsequent case
history.
21. See generally K. MILLER, MANAGING MADNESS (1976). See also ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEw MENTAL HEALTH LAW, 1969-1971,
131-34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ENKI].
22.

CAL.

WELF.

Cal. Stat. ch. 1374.

& INST. CODE §§ 5000-464 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1982); 1968
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without mandatory judicial review and to please the advocates
of due process reform, the legislature mandated that any care
beyond this seventeen day period was to be accomplished only
after judicial review.23
Evaluation confinement can be triggered by a police officer, a staff member of an evaluation facility, or another professional who has probable cause to believe that a person, as a
result of a mental disorder, is dangerous to himself, or to
others, or is gravely disabled.2 After a seventy-two hour detention, the statute allows certification under section 5250 for
an additional fourteen days of intensive treatment if:
1) The staff finds that the person is dangerous to himself
or to others, or is gravely disabled.
2) The person has been advised of but has not accepted
voluntary treatment. and
3) The facility can provide treatment."
The fourteen day certification is performed ex parte and no
hearing is required prior to certification. A copy of the certification notice is delivered to the patient and, at this time, he is
informed of his right to habeas corpus review and counsel."
In addition, the term "habeas corpus" must be explained to
him.'7 If the patient or another person acting on his behalf
requests a hearing during the fourteen day treatment period,
this request must be relayed to the superior court. Hearings
are to be held within two days of filing the petition.' 8 If a patient does not exercise his habeas corpus right, he can be detained involuntarily for a total period of seventeen days (seventy-two hours plus fourteen day certification) without any
judicial review.
The review stage that occurs post-certification requires
different procedures for different categories of patients.2' The
23. ENKI, supra note 21 at 15-16. See also Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d
666, 464 P.2d 56, 62 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970).
24. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
25. Id. at § 5250.
26. Id. at § 5252.1. A copy must also be delivered to the district attorney, the
state Department of Mental Health, and a person designated by the patient. Id. at §
5253.
27. Id. at § 5252.1.
28. Id. at §§ 5275, 5276.
29. The following categories of patients and review procedures have been established by the legislature: 1) The imminently dangerous-ninety day post evaluation
detention with mandatory review, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300 (West 1972 &
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commitment procedure, therefore, is quite simple at the initial
stages becoming more complex for longer periods of commitment. The result for the patient, however, is very little, if any,
due process protection prior to and during the seventeen day
evaluation-certification period. Moreover, the conclusions
drawn during this time by hospital staff are crucial to decisions for future incarceration. The legislature's compromise
was thus made at the expense of the allegedly mentally ill person who has not committed any violative act, and yet can be
confined as long as seventeen days without a hearing.
C.

California Decisions

This comment will emphasize federal court decisions because, for the most part, the California courts have not dealt
with the failure of LPS to provide due process protections
during the evaluation-certification period. The state courts
have focused on post-certification due process protections in
several decisions. The California Supreme Court, in Conservatorship of Roulet,s0 established the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict for post-certification conservatorship hearings for the gravely disabled. In
Conservatorship of Chambers,1 the California Court of Appeal rejected an attack on the vagueness of the grave disability standard for commitment. The court declared that the
standard was neither unconstitutionally broad nor vague.
The California court decisions reflect the same judicial
concerns the federal courts have had about the loss of liberty
and the risk of error attached to mental commitment. In People v. Burnickss and Roulet the California Supreme Court
stressed the inherent unreliability of psychiatric predictions
and the possibility of error in those predictions. The court's
concern served as its rationale for requiring proof beyond a
Supp. 1982); 2) the imminently suicidal-fourteen day extensions with no review, Id.
at §§ 5260-64; 3) the gravely disabled-thirty day temporary conservatorships (ef-

fected ex parte) without mandatory review, Id. at § 5352.1, or a one year conservatorship with mandatory review, Id. at § 5361.
30. 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979). This decision placed
conservatorship standards in line with the proof standards set by the California Supreme Court in People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1977) (narcotics addicts); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 509 (1975) (mentally disordered sex offenders).
31.

71 Cal. App. 3d 277, 139 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1977).

32.

14 Cal. 3d 306, 327, 535 P.2d 352, 366, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 502 (1975).
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reasonable doubt at LPS mandated hearings.
The only California decisions which address the certification period are Thorn v. Superior Court" and County of San
Diego v. Superior Court. 4 In Thorn, the supreme court
granted a non-profit corporation, established to provide a legal service, access to the Thorn psychiatric hospitals during
the fourteen day intensive treatment period; however, the
court's refusal to mandate a right to counsel during this period as a solution to due process problems limited the effectiveness of the availability of counsel to patients confined for
intensive treatment. The court did acknowledge the problems
inherent in a commitment scheme that relies on staff to outline habeas corpus rights to patients, who are often drugged or
3 5
otherwise incapacitated.

In County of San Diego v. Superior Court,86 the companion case to Thorn, the supreme court rejected a patient's
claim that the fourteen day certification without prior notice,
court hearings, or advisement as to right to counsel violated
due process. The court, referring to Thorn, noted that the act
had been amended to inform a certified patient of his right to
counsel.37 The California courts thus avoided any in-depth
constitutional analysis of the procedural safeguards during the
certification period; yet, seventeen days can have the subjective impact of seventeen years for one who is incarcerated involuntarily in an institution that is similar to a prison. The
legislature should provide some form of mandatory judicial review or procedural protection during this period to prevent
the unconstitutional deprivation of an individual's due process rights.
III. Doe v. Gallinot and Suzuki v. Yuen:

THE FEDERAL
COURTS EvALUATE COMMITMENT STATUTES

A.

Doe v. Gallinot
1. Background
The swiftness with which one can be drawn into the
33.

1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600. See supra note 23.

34.

1 Cal. 3d 677, 464 P.2d 63, 83 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1970).

35.

1 Cal. 3d at 675, 464 P.2d at 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 600.

36. 1 Cal. 3d 677, 464 P.2d 63, 83 Cal. Rptr. 607.
37. Id. at 678, 464 P.2d at 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
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"folds" of protective custody is aptly demonstrated by the experience of "John Doe" as outlined by the district court in
Doe v. Gallinot.3
Feburary 27: Upon receiving a complaint of a vehicle
blocking a driveway, Police Officer Gallinot arrived at a
hospital parking lot where he observed the plaintiff acting
"shy and apprehensive." As a result of Doe's disoriented
behavior and speech, Gallinot determined that he was unable to care for himself. He transferred Doe to a medical
facility where he was interviewed in the police officer's car
by a psychiatric nurse. The nurse authorized Doe for 72hour detention, basing the determination on her opinion
that the plaintiff was delusional, confused, and potentially explosive. Doe was then placed in restraints and
driven by ambulance to nearby Camarillo hospital where
within one hour he received intramuscularly 120 mg. of
thorzane, 4 mg. of stelazine and 1 1/150 gr. of hyocene.
Doe was admitted to Camarillo as gravely disabled. At no
time prior to his detention was there an investigation of
his ability to care for himself.
March 4: Doe was certified for 14 more days of treatment
as gravely disabled. At this time he requested a habeas
corpus hearing.
March 7: Doe's medication was augmented with 5 mgs. of
haldol given intramuscularly every hour. Doe requested a
change in his treatment but the request was disregarded.
Doe's hearing pursuant to his request for judicial review
by habeas corpus occurred that day. At the hearing he
asked for a private attorney. The hearing on his petition
was continued to March 11 in order for Doe to secure private counsel. Doe appeared to be heavily sedated and the
defense attorney requested that his dosage be lowered for
the hearing. This request was ignored.
March 11: Doe appeared with his private counsel and was
granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus because the
court found him not to be gravely disabled. He was released from Camarillo 14 days after his initial contact."1
Within an hour, diagnosis of John Doe's behavior was
changed from "shy and apprehensive" to "potentially explosive," and he was committed as "gravely disabled." The statutory definition of commitment for grave disability is "a condi38.
39.

486 F. Supp. 983, 990-94. See supra note 8.
Id. at 986-87.
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tion in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is
unable to provide for his basic personal needs, for food, clothing, or shelter.' 0 Yet no investigation was made of Doe's ability to care for himself, and he had committed no overt act.
Furthermore, he was given no due process protection prior to
the seventy-two hour detention, and no one was available to
determine that, in fact, his commitment was not based on a
definable statutory standard.
The plaintiff in Doe v. Gallinot (hereinafter Doe I) challenged several provisions of the LPS. He charged first, that
under the due process clause the standard of grave disability
is unconstitutionally vague and that second, the statute under
sections 5250-5252 does not provide minimum due process
protections for persons involuntarily confined as gravely disabled. 1 The district court denied the first charge that grave
disability as a standard for commitment is unconstitutionally
vague. The court, however, in response to the second charge,
ruled that due process requires a mandatory probable cause
hearing for the gravely disabled prior to fourteen day certification, basing its conclusion in part on the high degree of subjectivity involved in interpreting the grave disability standard. 42 The district court decision was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
While significantly improving procedural due process protections for the gravely disabled, the holding raises a special
equal protection question with reference to persons considered dangerous to themselves or others who do not receive the
mandatory probable cause hearing prior to fourteen day certification. Moreover, the court did not find the grave disability
standard unconstitutional; yet there are strong arguments
that the statute is vague and that, at the present time, it is
being used in an overly broad manner. Finally, the facts in
Doe raise an issue, as yet unaddressed by the California Legislature: whether there is a right to counsel during the evaluation-certification period.
40.

41.

CAL.

WELl. &

INST. CODE

486 F. Supp. at 984.
42. Id. at 984-85, 992.

§ 5008(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
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2. Due Process and the Right to a Mandatory Hearing
within Seventy-two Hours of Confinement
While the facts outlined in Doe I illustrate the ease with
which one can be placed under protective custody, the court's
analysis of Doe's situation during the time he was at
Camarillo reflects the procedural due process deficiencies that
occur during evaluation and treatment. First, the burden of
contesting fourteen day certification rests on the patient who
may be, as was Doe, heavily drugged. Second, Doe had to rely
on staff or other employees to explain his habeas corpus
rights. The court found that although the statute requires
'
that the staff thoroughly explain the term "habeas corpus,"
administrative directives failed to define the term to the staff.
Third, no written guidelines were followed in administering
medication. Finally, forensic staff members with little or no
knowledge of the particular case testified at the habeas corpus
hearing where, as the court stated, "the vast majority of patients are under medication . . . a condition which inhibits
their ability to participate in the proceedings."

In addition to the procedural deficiencies, the court was
concerned with what it perceived as a substantial risk of error
in applying the grave disability standard. 48 In light of the procedural deficiencies and the risk of error, the court concluded
that there must be a mandatory post seventy-two hour probable cause hearing for the gravely disabled. The court noted
that a probable cause hearing need not be conducted by a juor group
dicial officer as long as it was conducted by a "person
4
of persons independent of the mental hospital." "

The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed the district court decision in Doe v. Gallinot (hereinafter Doe 11).47 The Doe II
court, with reasoning similar to that of the district court,
grounded its decision on the failure of LPS to satisfy minimum requirements of due process, thereby implicating "an
important, constitutionally protected liberty interest of the
43. 486 F. Supp. at 988; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5252.1 (West 1972 & Supp.
1982).
44. 486 F. Supp. at 989.
45. Id. at 989, 991.
46. Id. at 994. The court referred to Doremus v. Farrel, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D.
Neb. 1975) (due process does not mandate a judicial hearing for involuntary civil

commitments).
47. 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
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person committed."4 The court agreed with the district
court's conclusion that habeas corpus review on demand did
not adequately protect against erroneous fourteen day
certification.4
The court followed the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Parham v. J.R.'0 in testing the challenged state
procedures. In Parham, the Court rejected district court-ordered hearings for minors prior to commitment. The Court
held, instead, that there must be some kind of inquiry by a
neutral factfinder "to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied."" In reaching this
conclusion, the Parham Court balanced the following factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Following this analysis, the Doe II court found that there was
a substantial private interest at stake because of "the massive
curtailment of liberty" and the "adverse social consequences"
resulting from commitment."
In applying the second prong of the Parham test, the
court agreed with the district court's finding "that commitment decisions under the LPS Act are highly error-prone especially where review of those decisions depended on the initiative and competence of the persons committed."" Moreover,
the court found convincing the district court's statistical analysis showing that of those detainees who obtained habeas
corpus review, "a significant number were discharged at or
before a hearing.""
48. Id. at 4864. The district court gave defendants a chance to develop a satisfactory program, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Legislation they drafted failed to
pass both houses of the state legislature and other efforts have also failed. Id.
49. Id. at 4865.

50. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 608.
Id. at 599 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
No. 80-5658 at 4866 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 491-92).
Id. at 4866 (quoting Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. at 989-90).
Id. (quoting 445 F. Supp. at 989-90). The Doe I court analyzed statistics
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Finally, with respect to the government's interest, the
court rejected the state's argument that mandatory hearings
would unduly burden physicians and psychiatrists who would
be testifying, and stated that such conclusions were merely
hypothetical.' The court noted, as did the district court, that
these procedures need not be conducted by a judge or judicial
officer. The Doe II court, however, substantially undermined
the district court decision by stating that a decision-maker
from within the hospital would suffice, 67 overlooking the district court's statement that the hearings must be conducted
by "a person or persons independent of the mental hospital."" The court thus opened the door to hearings conducted
by specialists employed by the hospital.
The Doe II court, in stating that institutional factfinders
would suffice, referred to the Supreme Court's conclusion in
both Parham and Vitek v. Jones." In Parham,the Court rejected any kind of third-party analysis, stating that psychiatrists were the best qualified to serve as neutral factfinders:
Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and
psychiatric diagnosis [citation omitted], we do not accept
the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always
be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the tools of medicine and science to an untrained
judge or administrative hearing officer .... 60
The Parham Court assumed that the psychiatrist would "sort
medically relevant facts," sense "motivational nuances" on
the part of parents, and "thoroughly investigate" the
situation."
The state should opt in favor of an entirely neutral
factfinder, for empirical evidence clearly indicates that psychiatrists tend to err on the side of commitment. 2 Justice Brennan's dissent in Parham emphasized this problem. He stated
from Camarillo State Hospital for 1975 and 1976 and from Los Angeles County for
1975.
56. Id. at 4867.

57. Id.
58. 486 F. Supp. at 994.

59. 445 U.S. at 496.
60. 442 U.S. at 609.
61. Id. at 611-13.
62. See, Rosenhan, supra note 3; See also Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1240-45 (1972) [hereinafter
Civil Commitment].
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that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights." As Justice Brennan
suggests, a factfinder with ties and loyalties to the institution
he represents is more likely to defer to the conclusions and
records of the institutional staff without sufficient objective
analysis. While full-blown hearings may not be constitutionally mandated, hearings conducted by persons independent of
the institution will understandably provide better due process
protection for the patient.
3. Mandatory Hearings and the Need for Uniformity
While resolving some due process problems, the establishment of mandatory probable cause hearings for the gravely
disabled raises special equal-protection problems. In Jackson
3
v. Indiana,6
the United States Supreme Court held that an

Indiana statutory procedure for civil commitment of an individual, who was charged with a crime but deemed incompetent to stand trial, denied him his right to equal protection
under the law. The statutes subjected the plaintiff to more
lenient commitment standards and more stringent release
standards than those used for civil commitment of individuals
not charged with offenses."
The California Supreme Court has applied a strict scrutiny test when it analyzed statutory disparities with respect to
civil commitments. In Roulet, the supreme court held that
there was no compelling state interest for differentiating between the gravely disabled and the imminently dangerous
when requiring a unanimous jury verdict prior to long-term
conduct.6 5 Likewise, a compelling state interest should be required to justify the unequal treatment of those dangerous to
themselves or others with respect to Doe mandated probable
cause hearings. At the present time, these individuals must
wait seventeen days for a hearing after the staff apprises them
of their rights, unless they request a habeas corpus hearing.
Furthermore, dangerousness should not be considered a compelling reason because of the recognized inconsistency of psychiatric predictions and because the hearing is only a protection for the patient and does not guarantee his or her release.
63.
64.
65.

406 U.S. 715 (1972).
Id. at 720-21, 730.
23 Cal. 3d at 230-31, 590 P.2d at 7-8, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
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There are compelling reasons for the state to apply consistent standards for all categories of the allegedly mentally
ill. First, the fact that one category now receives mandatory
hearings enhances the possibility that the staff will change the
status of the patient during the evaluation period from
gravely disabled to dangerous to himself or others in order to
avoid these hearings." Second, those categorized as dangerous
to themselves or others face the same procedural due process
deficiencies described by the courts in Doe I and Doe H and
by the supreme court in Thorn.e 7 Each court expressed concern about a plaintiff who, often under heavy medication,
must rely on the staff to apprise him of his habeas corpus
rights. As the Doe II court stated:
No matter how elaborate and accurate the habeas corpus
hearings available under the LPS Act may be once undertaken, their protection is illusory when a large segment of
the protected class cannot realistically be expected to set
the proceedings into motion in the first place .... Indeed, the irony of the appellants' argument is that the
more accurate the determination of the statutory habeas
corpus proceedings may be, the more irrational it is to afford those proceedings only to those in a position to request them."
One county now holding Doe mandated probable cause hearings for the gravely disabled reports a significant rise in the
number of habeas corpus requests as a result of these hearings." The hearing officer in this county informs the patient
of his right to a habeas corpus hearing at the end of his court
appearance. Thus, it may be concluded that a mandatory
probable cause hearing for all categories of mental commitment is necessary to safeguard due process rights.
Third, the same stigma attaches to the allegedly dangerous individual as to the gravely disabled person. Chief Justice
Bird in Roulet noted that society still views the mentally-ill
person with suspicion. "[T]he former mental patient is likely
66. A Santa Clara County public defender noted that at least one treatment
hospital is combining the grave disability and dangerousness categories to avoid the
mandatory hearings.
67. Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. at 988-89; Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d
at 666, 675, 464 P.2d at 56, 62, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 600, 606.
68. 657 F.2d at 1023.
69. Conversations with Santa Clara County public defender in January of 1981.
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to be treated with distrust and even loathing; he may be socially ostracized and victimized by employment and educational discrimination. . .

."10

Although the supreme court's

concern was directed at the stigma and loss of self-esteem resulting from post-certification confinement of the gravely disabled, the same stigma attaches to anyone categorized as mentally ill regardless of how short the period of confinement. In
Gerstein v. Pugh,71 the Supreme Court mandated probable
cause hearings promptly after arrest for those arrested without a warrant. The Court, using an analysis similar to Justice
Bird's stated that "pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job [and] interrupt his source of income. .

.

.When the

stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential . . . to furnish meaningful protection from
unfounded interference with liberty. 7' 2 In the civil commit-

ment proceeding, mandatory probable cause hearings within
seventeen hours of confinement will not guarantee release, but
will give each individual the opportunity to expose and have
rectified a possibly damaging mistake in diagnosis.
Finally, mandatory hearings for all categories of mental
commitment would make LPS consistent with many recent
decisions where the courts have balanced 'the state's need for
commitment against the concurrent stigma and loss of freedom that result from commitment, and have tipped the scale
in favor of mandatory hearings at an early stage of the process.7 In Lessard v. Schmidt,7

the court noted:

It must be remembered that at this time [the initial detention stage] the necessity for commitment of an individual has not yet been established. Those who argue that
notice and a hearing at this time may be harmful to the
patient ignore the fact that there has been no finding that
the person is in need of hospitalization. The argument
also ignores the fact that even a short detention in a
70. 23 Cal. 3d at 229, 590 P.2d at 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
71. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
72. Id. at 114.
73. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (hearings within 48 hours) (D.
Hawaii 1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (48 hours); Lynch v. Baxley, 386
F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (seven days); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D.
Neb. 1975) (five days); contra Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, (D. N.J. 1976) (920
days); Fhagen v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. N.Y. 1969) (up to 30 days before
hearing).
74. 413 F. Supp. 1318.
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mental facility may have long lasting effects on the individual's ability to function in the outside world due to the
stigma attached to mental illness.78
If, as the Doe I court stated, "[dlue process is safeguarded
only by a hearing," 7 it follows that the due process rights of
all allegedly mentally ill persons should be safeguarded by a
hearing.
4. Grave Disability: A Statutory Standard that Allows
Due Process Violations at the Initial Stage of Commitment
The court in Doe I held that the grave disability term was
sufficiently precise. The court found that grave disability implicitly required a finding of harm to oneself, i.e. an inability
to provide for one's basic physical needs, and therefore met
the constitutional requirement of dangerousness. 7 7 According
to the court, this standard was much more specific than others
that federal courts have found to be unconstitutionally vague.
The standards challenged in other cases allowed commitment
based upon a finding that a person was mentally ill and either
needed or would benefit from treatment.7 8 The court ignored
the fact that Doe himself was involuntarily committed without any investigation of his ability to provide food, clothing or
shelter for himself. The court, however, did recognize that
"well-intentioned persons might find that certain standards of
food, clothing and shelter are basic even though failure to
meet them does not harm or endanger a person sufficiently to
justify commitment." 9
Despite the Doe I court's conclusion, there are good indications that the grave disability standard is vague and overbroad and that the standard does fall within the "vast uncontoured description of mental ills" that other courts have
rendered unconstitutional.8 0 While vagueness refers to the
specificity of a statute, overbreadth refers to the reach. A statute with a measure of specificity could be deemed overly
broad if, in fact, it prohibits or chills constitutionally pro75. 349 F. Supp. at 1091 nn.17 & 18.
76. 486 F. Supp. at 994.
77. Id. at 991.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1096
(E.D. Mich. 1974)).
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tected behavior.8 ' The California standard fails to meet either
test.
As the Doe I court stated, the vagueness of the standard
lends itself to possible interpretations that do not come within
constitutional limits."2 In fact, the standard "was intentionally
vague in order to provide. . . services to individuals who were
incompetent to function independently.1 83

Due process requires that statutes provide fair warning to
individuals and that they be specific enough to prevent arbitrary enforcement.8 4 Although the vagueness standard is generally applied to criminal statutes, the Supreme Court has
pointedly stated that due process rights are not controlled by
the type of proceeding." Justice Black, in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,s stated that a statute fails to meet the requirement of
the due process clause in civil proceedings if it "is so vague
and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide
without any legally fixed standards what is prohibited and
what is not in each particular case." 87 In the habeas corpus

hearings monitored in a recent study by Carol Warren, the
most common criteria for commitment of the gravely disabled
was prior hospitalization (70%), with failure to take medication the second most common criteria (45%). 88 The gravely

disabled standard is so vague that it does not provide the
"legally fixed standards" necessary to satisfy the requirement
of due process. The fact that the police officer in Doe decided
S1. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
82. 486 F. Supp. at 991.
83. ENKI, supra note 21, at 228.
84. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The Court in
Grayned cited three important harms a vague statute may cause: 1) It may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning, 2) It delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries on an ad hoc basis, and 3) It may cause people "to steer far
wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were
clearly marked." Id. at 108-09.
85. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970). In Winship the court refused to allow the state's civil labels and good intentions to obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards. See also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
86. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
87. Id. at 402-03. See also A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Co., 267 U.S. 233,
239-42 (1924); Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10, 17-19
(S.D. Iowa 1975); Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
88. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of
California'sLanterman-Petris-ShortAct, 11 LAw & Soc'" REv. 629, 634 (Sept. 1977).
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that the plaintiff's behavior fell within the statutory standard
further exemplifies the problems inherent in such a subjective
standard."9 John Doe was "shy and apprehensive," thirty minutes later he was extremely delusional and paranoid." As a
result, he was deemed to be gravely disabled and the net
swept him into the system under a statutory requirement of
inability to provide food, clothing, or shelter. Doe was, in fact,
self-employed, managing two apartment buildings in Los Angeles. He was capable of obtaining private medical assistance,
his closets housed sufficient amounts of clothing and he was
able to provide food for his nourishment."1
If the people who engage in lawful, protected behavior,
albeit eccentric or strange, are being penalized because of this
behavior, the statute is in danger of encouraging detention of
those who maintain unusual life styles. The right to choose
and practice a particular life style is protected by the first
amendment rights of association, assembly, and free expression. The Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas,92 noted that
risking the loss of liberty on the basis of unusual conduct
must be avoided, for "loss of liberty calls for a showing that
that individual suffers from something more serious than is
demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior."9 3 Warren's study indicated that, in fact, the California statute is penalizing those
who demonstrate "idiosyncratic behavior." The author found
that nonstatutory violations of folkways (wearing bizarre
dress, being transient, having a dirty home, etc.) were common criteria for the initial commitment under a grave disability standard. Furthermore, these patterns of behavior were
those most frequently used as evidence of failure to provide
food, clothing, or shelter at subsequent habeas corpus hearings.95 This broad use of the gravely disabled category can be
89. In a deposition, Officer Gallinot stated that he felt that grave disability included "a combination of endangerment to himself and endangerment to others in
that he [mental patient) wasn't able to care for himself mentally or emotionally."
Brief for plaintiff, at 99, Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 984 (citing deposition of Gary
Gallinot at 14-15 (filed 6-13-78)).
90. 486 F. Supp. at 986-87.
91. See brief for-plaintiff at 108, 486 F. Supp. 984.
92. 441 U.S. 427 (1979).
93. 441 U.S. at 427. See also Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970)
(an officer may not penalize an individual for engaging in nonconformist activity).
94. Warren, supra note 88, at 633.
95. Id. at 638.
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analogized to the ordinance and vagrancy statutes that the
Supreme Court deemed to be unconstitutionally vague and
broad. s Justice Douglas, in discussing the Jacksonville City
vagrancy ordinance, stated:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of
the ordinance-poor people, nonconformists, dissenters,
idlers-may be required to comport themselves according
to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville
police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by
the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. 7
Several studies have indicated that the vagueness of the
gravely disabled standard has allowed it to be used as a possible escape hatch to prolong institutional confinement.98 Patients, originally committed as dangerous, who become less
dangerous after seventy-two hours because of tranquilizing
medicines, often have their status changed to the less demanding standard of gravely disabled. In Warren's study, only
11% of the patients were admitted as gravely disabled. By the
time of the habeas corpus hearings, however, 52% had "become" gravely disabled. 99
Due to the problems caused by the vagueness of the grave
disability standard, the legislature should consider eliminating
it as a category for involuntary commitments. In fact, most
recent court decisions have invalidated similarly vague standards on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. 00 Of these
96.

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (statute prohibit-

ing common night walkers); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965)
(unlawful to stand, loiter or walk upon any street or sidewalk so as to obstruct free

passage); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
97. 405 U.S. at 170-71.
98. See Morris, Conservatorship for the Gravely Disabled, California's
Nondeclaration of Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 201 (1978); See also
ENKI, supra note 21, at 155 (results of this study indicated grave disability was be-

ing used as a catch-all for patients that could not be held under a stricter definition);

cf. Amsterdam, Federal ConstitutionalRestrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of

Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 219, 226 (1967) (vagrancy legislation is not essentially aimed at

the prohibiton of any specific act; it is purposefully made "obscure to serve the function of a catch all. . .").
99. Warren, supra note 88, at 645.
100. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975) (statute un-

constitutionally vague, overbroad, and violative of due process of law); Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (law allowing commitment on showing
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the greatest implication for Califordecisions, the one having
01
Yuen.
v.
Suzuki
is
nia
B. Suzuki v. Yuen: A Higher Standard for Involuntary
Commitments
1. Background
Suzuki v. Yuen is the last of three decisions in which Hawaii's mental health statutes were evaluated. In Suzuki v.
Quisenberry,102 the first of the trilogy, three plaintiffs who
had been involuntarily detained under Hawaii's mental health
statute sought a declaratory judgment that certain provisions
of Hawaii's mental health statute were unconstitutional and
an injunction against the use of the nonconsensual provisions
.of the statute. The district court declared that certain nonconsensual, non-emergency provisions of the statute were unconstitutional. The court retained jurisdiction of the case
pending legislative amendment. The court did find the emergency provisions in the Hawaii statute constitutional in that
they limited detention to a person who posed an immediate
threat to himself or others as evidenced by a recent overt
act.108 Additionally, the emergency statute allowed only
fourty-eight hours of commitment before a mandatory hearing. In Suzuki v. Alba,10 4 the court declared certain parts of
the amended statute unconstitutional. The court held that 1)
in both emergency and non-emergency situations, the state
can not involuntarily commit one who is dangerous only to
property, 0 5 2) in a non-emergency situation, the state cannot
involuntarily commit one up to five days for evaluation because this procedure violates the fifth amendment's privilege
of mental illness and "best interest" of the individual is too imprecise); Kendall v.
True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (statute unconstitutionally vague for failure
to require a finding of dangerousness); Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital at
Eloise, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (statute vague and overbroad because it
lacked the requisite element of dangerousness) relying on Humphry v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972).
101. 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
102. 411 F. Supp. 1113.
103. Id. at 1119, 1125. The Hawaii definition of dangerousness specifies that
dangerousness must be "evidenced by an act, attempt or threat." HAWAI REv. STAT. §
334-1 (1976). California's statute has no such definition of dangerousness.
104. 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Hawaii 1977).
105. Id. at 1109-10.

19821

INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENTS

against self-incrimination, 10 6 3) in a non-emergency commitment the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person needs commitment before there can be a five-day evaluation,10 7 and 4) in non-emergency, non-consensual commitment, the Hawaii statute unconstitutionally failed to require a
finding of imminent and substantial danger as evidenced by a
recent overt act, attempt or threat. 10 8
In Suzuki v. Yuen, 0 9 the Ninth Circuit issued a four-part
decision, affirming in part and reversing in part, the lower
court's decision in Alba. The court concluded that the present
statute's provision for commitment of a person dangerous to
property and its failure to require showing of imminent danger before commitment was unconstitutional.' 1 0 Contrary to
the district court's ruling, the court held that the statute did
not deprive persons of their privilege against self-incrimination and that the state need not establish the elements of
commitment beyond a reasonable doubt."'
2. Impact of Suzuki v. Yuen on California's Commitment Statute
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state must find a
threat of imminent danger to oneself or others as evidenced
by a recent overt act. This has serious implications for California law. Since LPS does not have the same requirement,
the statute is unconstitutional. Commitment exclusively on
the basis of grave disability does not meet the Yuen standard." ' In light of this Ninth Circuit decision, the California
Legislature will need to reconsider the continuing use of grave
disability as a standard for commitment.
The Yuen court's requirement of imminent dangerousness reflects the recent increase in procedural protections at
all stages of the commitment process. This requirement is not
reflected in California law. Section 5150 of LPS allows commitment of a person who is gravely disabled or dangerous to
himself or others. Because the section does not include the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1111-12.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1110.
617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 174.
Id.
See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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critical terms "a finding of imminent danger as evidenced by a
recent overt act, attempt or threat," it clearly does not reach
the standard set forth in Yuen for all categories of committed
individuals.
Grave disability does not include an element of impending dangerousness. As a result, this part of the statute should
either be deleted or redefined. Failure to provide food, clothing, or shelter is the requisite standard for grave disability.
The additional requirement in Yuen of an overt act, attempt,
or threat implies aggressive behavior.11
The Doe court stated that commitment statutes are unconstitutional unless there is a finding of dangerousness. The
court relied on Suzuki v. Quisenberry to support its position.11 The decision in Suzuki v. Alba in which the Hawaii
court held that the dangerousness standard for civil commitments must include a finding of imminent dangerousness and
a recent overt act was overlooked or ignored.' 15 This omission
may be the reason why the court failed to more carefully scrutinize the grave disability standard.
The Yuen standard affords greater protection for those
who exhibit eccentric behavior or lifestyles. Police officers can
more readily assess behavior that is overtly dangerous. Families will be informed that mere intractability is insufficient to
commit an individual. Mentally ill persons who pose no immediate threat to themselves or to others, should be allowed to
move about freely and should be encouraged to obtain voluntary outpatient care. Application of a commitment standard
that is dangerously vague and overbroad is "tantamount to
condoning the state's commitment of persons deemed socially
unacceptable for the purpose of indoctrination or conforming
the individual's beliefs to the beliefs of the state."6 The
Yuen standard is a common-sense solution to the current inadequacies of the California statute.
113. See Wexler, Comments and Questions about Mental Health Law in Hawaii, HAWAI B. J., Winter 1978, at 5. Wexler suggests that the dangerousness standard in Suzuki implies affirmative behavior. See also Overt DangerousBehavior as a
Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Commitment, 44 U. CHI. L. Rav. 562
(1976-1977). The author's examples of overt behavior include: slitting wrists, bran-

dishing a knife and not eating for several days.
114.

486 F. Supp. at 991.

115. 438 F. Supp. at 1110. The Doe court denied, without prejudice, plaintiff's
motion to reconsider grave disability in light of Suzuki v. Yuen.
116. Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514.
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING THE EVALUATION-CERTIFICA-

TION PERIOD

A mandatory right to counsel is essential at the earliest
stages of the commitment process for several reasons. First, a
patient's right to a habeas corpus hearing is jeopardized when
he must rely on staff to apprise him of this right. Second, the
patient needs the guidance of counsel to ensure that his right
to adequate treatment is protected. Third, the patient is subjected to a potentially coercive psychiatric examination without any procedural protection and the conclusions drawn by
the psychiatrist are frequently the sole criteria used for further commitment. It is, therefore, clear that counsel should be
available to the patient, to advise him and to negotiate on his
behalf if necessary. Counsel could include the use of attorneysupervised paralegals serving as patient's advocates. The essential element is representation that is separate from and independent of the mental health system.
A.

Counsel at the Earliest Stage of Commitment

The patient in California may request counsel at the time
he receives notice of fourteen day certification. No California
court to date has effectively challenged this system. In Thorn,
the court mentioned the possible role conflict arising from entrusting notice and explanation of rights to the same agency
that undertakes to perform the therapeutic function. 117 Under
the present system, staff members, who themselves may not
understand the basis for the habeas corpus right, are responsible for communicating this important information to the patient. At the least, mandatory counsel should be appointed at
this stage of the commitment process.
A more efficient solution to the dilemma would be assignment of counsel or counsel-supervised independent advocates
to the patient upon arrival at a hosptial. An independent advocate would be an important source for the patient with respect to apprising him of his rights. The advocate could also
monitor any change of status during evaluation. Until
mandatory hearings are provided for all mentally ill patients,
'the presence of an advocate is especially important to see that
the patient's diagnosis is not changed simply to avoid
117.

1 Cal. 3d at 675, 464 P.2d at 62, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
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mandatory probable cause hearings for the gravely disabled.
Additionally, extending this protection to the earliest stages
of commitment would stabilize a force that may work against
the patient's best interest: the psychiatric evaluation.
B. Treatment: Assistance of
Treatment

Counsel in

Choice of

Within one hour of his confinement, plaintiff Doe was
given heavy doses of psychotropic drugs, chemical agents used
to manage and treat serious mental illness. Doe's only statutory right with respect to treatment was the right to refuse
electro-shock therapy and lobotomy. 118 Doe wanted a change
in treatment, however, his request was ignored. Additionally,
the court reported that no administrative guidelines with respect to treatment were followed." ' If, at this point, Doe
could have availed himself of counsel, a treatment plan developed to meet his individual needs and designed to rehabilitate
rather than domesticate could have been assured. Moreover, a
state legislative study indicated that patients in California are
receiving too much drug medication. The study established
that only 56% of the psychiatrists and 26% of the nursing
staff in twenty-five facilities informed patients about medications. A significant number (23%) of the patients received unwanted treatment.120 Because psychotropic drugs can have
long-term effects on the patient and can seriously affect his
ability to make rational decisions, the availability of counsel
or other persons who can negotiate on the patient's behalf is
essential at the earliest stages of confinement.
Counsel could additionally facilitate a better relationship
between the patient and the hospital staff. The line between
voluntarily accepted treatment and coerced treatment is very
narrow. Stress resulting from forced or coerced medication
might result in total rejection of medication after release. In
California, there is an additional coercive element because the
118.
119.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).

486 F. Supp. at 988.

120.

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE USE AND
MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS IN CALIFORNIA'S MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS, 9, 36

(June 1977). See also Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1136-38 (D.N.J. 1978) (discussion of the effects of psychotropic drugs on patients); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment, Nw. U.L. REV. 461
(1977).
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term of commitment may be extended if the patient refuses
treatment."1 If the patient has reservations about treatment,
third-party assistance independent of the hospital staff may
make him feel more secure and facilitate a treatment decision
that is in his best interests.122
C. Psychiatrists:Assistance of Counsel During Psychiatric
Evaluation
The validity of psychiatric prediction has been questioned increasingly by both psychiatrists and legal experts, yet
psychiatrists remain an indispensable part of the evaluation
process. In fact, the Yuen court premised its rejection of a
fifth amendment right to silence on the conclusion that the
person dangerous to himself or others must receive psychiatric
evaluation.2 8 The Supreme Court in Addington reflected the
prevailing attitude when it stated: "Whether the individual is
mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psy24
'
chiatrists and psychologists."'

By endorsing psychiatric predictions, the courts have ignored the lack of procedural protections for the involuntarily
committed patient during the evaluation-certification period.
The patient is denied both the right to counsel and a witness
during any psychiatric interviews that occur. Yet there is evidence that psychiatrists, in addition to being ineffective
predictors, ignore statutory criteria when evaluating patients.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5252.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
122. The right of a patient in non-emergency situations to refuse treatment has
received consideration and acceptance in several judicial districts. The United States

121.

Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on this issue. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d
650 (1980), cert. granted, No. 80-1417. See also Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.
1976) (forced medication interferes with first amendment right and the right to bodily privacy); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (the right to privacy

requires a hearing prior to the forced administration of drugs).
The California Constitution, art. I, § 1 guarantees to each citizen of the state an
inalienable right to privacy. In recent legislation, the California Legislature affirmed
this right for involuntarily committed individuals even at the "expense" of treatment.
Section 5325.1 provides in part that the patient has a right to a course of treatment

that is the least restrictive of his personal liberty, a right to dignity, privacy, and
humane care, and a right to participate in community activities. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5325.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).

123.

617 F.2d at 177. See also Trippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1162 (4th

Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, Judge, concurring) (granting an individual a right to silence
would thwart personal examinations and interviews considered indispensable).
124.

418 U.S. at 420. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 611-13 (1979).
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Finally, the courts ignore the potentially damaging consequences of the use of a psychiatrist as a witness against his
patient.
The psychiatric evaluation is crucial to all future commitment decisions; yet, there are no procedural safeguards during
evaluation and no monitoring of the rationale for the evaluator's conclusions. Moreover, there is evidence that psychiatrists tend to overdiagnose mental illness to protect themselves from possible negative publicity. 125 Recent studies have
indicated that psychiatrists are resisting or ignoring statutory
commitment criteria. A Canadian study of commitments
before and after higher standards for commitment were established indicates that mental states (paranoia, confusion),
physical appearance, and prior hospitalization still received
the most tallies from psychiatrists in involuntary commitment
evaluations.' 26 In the Warren study, an evaluation of factors
influential in habeas corpus hearings showed that the most
common criteria for commitment of the gravely disabled was
prior hospitalization, failure to take medication, and the denial of illness. 2 ' These criteria have no relationship to the
statutory standard of whether a patient has the ability to provide his or her basic needs.
Because counsel is not allowed at the psychiatric interview, there is little opportunity to expose the psychiatrist who
consistently abuses or ignores the courts' established standards or to analyze effectively the criteria the psychiatrist
used in reaching his conclusions. 1 28 This situation inhibits
125. Civil Commitment supra note 62. See also Conservatorship of Roulet, 23
Cal. 3d 219, 230, 590 P.2d 1, 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. 424, 431 (1979) (discussing lack of
consistency in psychiatric decisions and of the tendency to over-diagnose).
126. Page and Yates, Civil Commitment and the Danger Mandate, 18 CAN.
PSYCHIATRIC A. J. 265, 268-69 (1973).
127. Warren, supra note 88, at 633-34.
128. See Comment, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental Health
Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 851, 862 (1970). See also In Re Spenser, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 41213, 406 P.2d 33, 41-42, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 761-62 (1965). In a criminal prosecution, if
the defendant raises insanity as a defense, a psychiatrist will be appointed to examine
the defendant. In Spenser the California Supreme Court held that counsel for the
defendant was not required at the psychiatric interview if certain safeguards were
provided for the defendant. Before submitting to an examination the defendant must

be represented by counsel or have knowingly and intelligently waived that right. His
counsel must be informed of the appointment of a psychiatrist. Moreover, it is within

the court's discretion to allow counsel or a defense psychiatrist to be present as an
observer. Id. at 412, 406 P.2d at 41, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
In the criminal prosecution, the defendant through his own volition has raised
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meaningful evaluation of the examiner's conclusions in subsequent hearings. In LPS, the California Legislature provided
that during court-ordered evaluations the patient may have
relatives, friends, an attorney, a personal physician or other
professional, or a religious advisor present if the patient so
requests. 129 The provision indicates that the legislature believed that the presence of outside parties would not interfere
with the purpose of the interview. The presence of friends, a
personal physician, or other professionals would inhibit any
tendency on the part of the psychiatrist to intimidate the patient. A more effective procedure would provide for the presence of counsel to monitor the conditions of the examination
and ensure that due process was followed, and to obtain information to be used when representing the client in later
hearings.
An additional reason for the presence of counsel at the
psychiatric examination is that a forensic staff member with
little or no knowledge of the particular case frequently testifies at the hearing solely on the basis of staff members' contact with the patients being reviewed.130 Counsel that has observed the interview could more effectively evaluate this
testimony. Ideally, a psychiatric interview should be a confidential experience between patient and physician. The therapeutic function of the psychiatrist is seriously jeopardized,
however, when he is a potential witness against his patient."'
This untenable situation can only lead to inevitable tension
between the need of the psychiatrist to diagnose and treat effectively and the need and right of the patient to due process
the insanity defense thereby implicitly requesting some type of psychiatric examination. In involuntary civil commitments there is no volitional act on the part of the
patient. He must submit to a psychiatric evaluation and yet he is not accorded even
minimal due process protections.
129. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5206 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
130. 486 F. Supp. at 989. See also CAL. EvID. CODE § 1004 (West 1972) (no
psychotherapist-patient privilege in a commitment or guardianship hearing).

131.

See

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICI-

ARY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. and 88th Cong., 2nd Sesa. (1961 and 1963) (statement of

Thomas S. Szasz), reprinted in Katz, Goldstein, and Derschowitz, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 471, 472-73 (1967). If the psychiatrist is to assist the patient "to
understand his aspirations and strategies . . . how can the psychiatric situation be
used to curtail the patient's freedom . . . . The crucial issue is whether the psychia-

trist is to be considered the agent of the patient or of someone else." See also,
Headman, The Psychiatrist as a Conservative Agent of Social Control, 20 Social
Problems 263, 263-71 (1972).
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protections. An analysis of the effect of these tensions on subsequent treatment should be more carefully studied because
the right to treatment is an important part of the commitment rationale.
A less effective but possible alternative to having counsel
available at the interview would be documentation or possibly
taping of the psychiatric examination. The documentation or
taping would provide a record of the questions and the patient's responses. The record could then be reviewed and evaluated by a court and persons acting on behalf of the patient.
The psychiatrist's current role as a predictor of dangerousness
and/or disability is crucial to the patient's future commitments. As long as the psychiatrist retains this pivotal role in
the commitment process, some provision should be made for
monitoring that role.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN

LPS

EVALUATION

PROCEDURES

The California Legislature should continue to narrow the
road to involuntary commitment. In devising the new mental
health act, the legislature has already attempted to decrease
involuntary commitments. Although this objective has been
partially achieved,1 32 inequities in the statute remain, and the
legislature should consider the necessary steps to reduce or
eliminate these. First, the legislature should consider the inclusion of a finding of dangerousness, as evidenced by a recent
overt act, in its standard for commitment of those alleged to
be dangerous to themselves or others. Because the standard of
grave disability does not include the requisite element of imminent dangerousness and because there is good indication
that this standard is being applied in an unconstitutionally
broad manner, the legislature should consider eliminating the
grave disability standard for involuntary commitment. In addition to these changes in the commitment standards, alternatives to involuntary commitment of the acutely disabled
should be considered. For the imminently dangerous and
those deemed gravely disabled, a mandatory outpatient evaluation progam is a possible alternative to involuntary evaluation confinement.'"8 This would support the deinstitutional132.

ENKI, supra note 21, at 190-97.

133. Id. at 230-31. The ENKI report mentioned this alternative for those
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ization goal of LPS. If the patient refused this option, he
could then be involuntarily confined.
Concomitant with the concept of deinstitutionalization is
the concept of adequate outpatient care. The need for more
funding to provide better care was made drastically clear by
the public reaction to the Doe decisions. Newspapers carried
articles expressing alarm at the possibility of the "release" of
'gravely disabled mental patients as a result of a mandatory
hearing."" This attitude undermines the goal of reducing involuntary commitments; however, it is true that many of these
patients, if released, will receive inadequate outpatient care, if
any. The lack of non-hospital acute and sub-acute twenty-four
hour care facilities has been noted by a California Assembly
Subcommittee. " ' Heightened legalistic reponse to due process
inequities as seen in the Doe and Yuen decisions should obligate the state to seek adequate alternatives.
Second, the legislature should require the presence of
mandatory counsel or a counsel-supervised negotiator at all
stages of the commitment process to further enhance a patient's procedural due process protection. "Adequate" counsel
is a serious issue with respect to commitments. Commentators
have written extensively on inadequate representation of the
mentally ill, in particular on the failure of counsel to adequately interview clients or assume an adversary role on their
behalf during hearings. "' The effective use of paralegals, possibly including former mental patients, to serve as advocates
for the patient is a possible alternative to already
overburdened public defender staffs. However, these advocates would need to work closely with attorneys.
California currently has a patient advocacy program.13
The program provides that each county mental health direcprocessed on a penal code violation who are LPS eligible.
134. Peninsula Times Tribune, Oct. 31, 1980, at 1, col. 1. In a front-page article,
a veterans hospital official expressed concern about the release of patients who are

not ready for release.
135. California Assembly Permanent Subcommittee on Mental Health and Development Disabilities, Improving California'sMental Health System: A Framework
for Public Contributions (Sept. 30, 1977). Outpatient intervention often consists of
only one hour a week of the client's time. See also ENKI, supra note 21, at 23.
136. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424 (1966). See also How to Represent a Client Facing
Civil Commitment, THE PRACTICAL LAWYER, December 1, 1980, at 51 (article reflects
the increased concern over inadequate representation for the mentally ill).
137. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325, 5500-50 (West Supp. 1982).
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tor appoint one or more county patient's rights advocate.15
These advocates are usually social workers. Effective thirdparty intervention cannot be provided by such minimal services. Moreover, the only program this author found that provided for attorney supervision of patient's advocates was in
Santa Clara County. Section 5521 of LPS explicitly separates
the advocacy program from county programs that provide legal services, thus depriving the advocate and the involuntarily
committed patient of a crucial link with the person who may
ultimately defend that patient against confinement.'5 8 Because of this separation, the patient advocacy program cannot
provide the legal representation the patient may require or
need. Ready access to attorneys for consultation about patient's rights or attorney representation at such critical stages
of the evaluation period as when the patient is advised of his
rights, is not available under the present state advocacy
program.
Third, hearings at the end of the 72-hour evaluation period should be required for those alleged to be dangerous to
themselves or to others as well as those who are gravely disabled. The stigma attached to even a short period of commitment, the possibility of error in the initial determinations of
mental illness and the fact that statutory guidelines for commitment are being ignored are factors that strongly support
138. CAL.
139.

CAL.

WELF. & INST. CODE § 5520 (West Supp. 1982).
WELFl. & INST. CODE § 5521 states that the advocates shall not dupii-

cate, replace or conflict with existing local or mandated legal representation and that
statutes providing for local public defender or court appointed attorney representation shall remain the responsibility of local agencies. This section does allow for
"maximum cooperation" between legal representatives and providers of advocacy services but gives no specific guidelines with respect to the cooperation it mentions. In
contrast, New York provides a Mental Health Information Service (MIHS) independent of the hospital and supervised by the appellate court. The MIHS provides legal
services for the institutionalized mentally disabled. In at least two of the state divisions under MIHS, attorneys comprise a majority of the staff. Such a program is
much more capable of providing for the vigorous pursuit of patients' rights and complaints than is California's current advocacy program. Moreover, because MIHS attorneys represent patients at hearings, delay and duplication of investigative work is
avoided thus reducing unnecessary public expense. An ideal patient advocacy staff
should consist of both attorneys and social workers. Santa Clara County's program,
which has this combination, should be carefully studied by the state. See N.Y.
MENTAL Hyo. LAW §§ 9.08, 9.09, 29.09 (McKinney 1978). See also Gupta, New York's
Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RuTGms L.
Rsv. 405, 413-50 (1971); Boderick, Justice in the Books or Justice in Action: An
InstitutionalApproach to Involuntary Hospitalizationfor Mental Illness, 20 CATH.
U.L. Rzv. 547, 619-32 (1972).
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this conclusion. Finally, the role of the psychiatrist as both a
"predictor" of dangerousness and as a commentator about the
patient's condition should be re-evaluated. If used at all, psychiatrists should be used, as Professor Stone has suggested,
not to predict, but only to relate whether their findings result
in a conclusion that there is a serious, reliably diagnosed
mental illness (i.e. profound anxiety, panic, depression, deterioration of the personality) that is treatable and incidentally
dangerous. 1 0 "A compassionate law and a compassionate psychiatrist should direct attention to the issue of human agony
rather than the behavior which may or may not flow from
it."M41

As this comment suggests, the road to commitment remains fraught with inconsistencies. Ideally, mental hospitals
should be entered voluntarily with the support of friends and
relatives in a non-coercive manner. Psychiatrists could then
be returned to their original and important role of therapeutic
treatment of the mentally ill. As long as California continues
to have a system of involuntary commitments, it remains tor
the courts to continue in their traditional role as "protector of
individual rights against state power: 14 2 A responsibility that
43
cannot be delegated to the medical profession.'
Gretchen 0. Burford

140. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, 66-67
(1975); see also CouNTY oF Los ANGELES, DEPT. Op MENTAL HEALTH, PROPOSED LPS
14 (2nd draft Nov. 1980). A proposed revision in LPS provides that medical experts give evidence as to diagnosis and treatability. "Predictions of danger,
where they are pertinent at all, judgments of competence and decisions concerning
detention on an involuntary basis, are made by functionaries of the legal system."
REVISIONS,

141.

STONE, supra note 140, at 67.

142. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization,and the Adversary
Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 910 (1975).
143. Id.

